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1I. Introduction: Transaction Costs Economics
and the Strategy Field*
With respect to its role in the strategy field, transaction cost economics (henceforth,
”TCE”) is in a strange position.  After attracting a great deal of sympathetic attention
and influence at the beginning of the nineteen-eighties following the fundamental
work of Williamson (1975) and the first applications to management studies (e.g.,
Dundas and Richardson 1980; Ouchi 1980; Rumelt 1984) , TCE seems to have become
the bete noire of the strategy field.  Thus, the rhetorics of many a paper published in
such top business administration journals as Academy of Management Review,
Organization Science and Administrative Science Quarterly is unabashedly and
uncompromisingly anti-TCE.  Particularly strong attacks have been carried out by
Kogut and Zander (1992), Madhok (1996) and Ghoshal and Moran (1996; see also this
book), writing from a competence/knowledge/resource-based perspective.1  In fact,
these contributions constitute much of a counter-revolution to the revolution in
management studies represented by the influence of TCE in particular and
organizational economics (henceforth, ”OE”) more broadly.2  If anything, the
counter-revolution appears to have gained momentum recently.  This is bizarre,
because more and more papers with a TCE orientation  are published in the leading
strategy journals.  Thus, while the TCE does not appear to be liked by many, it is in
fact applied by many.  There is a strange schism between rhetorics and practice here.
Because of this schizophrenic situation, the TCE has seldom been explicitly defended;
rather, it has been applied in silence.
However, in a recent paper Oliver Williamson (1999) set out to explicitly defend
TCE against its knowledge-based critics.  He examined a number of fundamental
”moves” that TCE had accomplished with respect to what is assumed about human
actors, what is the relevant unit of analysis, the amount of empirical work done, the
presence of a sophisticated efficiency analysis, etc. Williamson concluded that the
competence-based critics of TCE was in actuality way behind TCE with respect to all
these ”moves” ¾ which, he noted, was perhaps not so surprising given that the TCE
has had a much longer gestation period than the competence approach. He
concluded that both the TCE and the competence approach were ”… needed in our
efforts to understand complex economic phenomena as we build towards a science of
organization” (1999: 1106) (see also Foss and Foss 2000a).
The present paper is different from Williamson’s paper, although it
complements it by lending support to his argument that ”… economizing is more
fundamental than strategizing” (1994: 362).  It is more in the nature of a fundamental
                                               
*  The comments of Kirsten Foss and Volker Mahnke are gratefully acknowledged.
1 In the following, I use the term ”resource-based” to also cover ”knowledge-based,” ”capabilities-
based,” ”competence-based” etc.
2 In addition to the TCE, OE includes agency theory (e.g., Holmström and Milgrom 1991), team theory
(e.g., Carter 1995), and incomplete contract theory (e.g., Hart 1995).
2and perhaps provocative argument that the basic insights of TCE and related
economics of organization approaches are indispensable to the strategy field.
Moreover, it is perhaps less concialiatory than Williamson’s paper.  Thus, the paper
may be seen as being in the nature of a manifesto for a counter-counter-revolution.
More precisely, I argue that TCE and other fields in the economics of organization
are necessary (at the present stage of the evolution of the field) to make sense out of,
not only ”the deep structure of organization” (Williamson 1996), but also ”the deep
structure of strategy.”  Indeed, these deep structures are composed of the same stuff
¾ namely, transaction costs.
Thus, the argument is in broad agreement with Rumelt’s claim – made two
decades ago – that “... it appears obvious that the study of business strategy must rest
on the bedrock foundations of the economist’s model of the firm” (1984: 557), more
specifically with the transaction cost approach to economic organization (Coase 1937,
1960; Williamson 1975, 1985, 1996).  However, while transaction cost insights are
indeed necessary, they are certainly not sufficient.  In particular, TCE (and OE
generally) is much under-developed with respect to taking account of cognitive
issues (as admitted by Williamson 1998).  Psychological and experimental economics
research has revealed the existence of fundamental, persistent and systematic
cognitive biases that influence decision-making, sometimes dramatically.3  Arguably,
these challenges are much more basic and important to meet than those coming from
the resource-based critics of TCE (Foss and Foss 2000a).
The design of the paper is the following.  I begin by critically reviewing the
perhaps dominant approach to strategy content research, namely the ”resource-
based perspective” (henceforth, the ”RBP”).  I argue that this approach at best paints
a very limited picture of firm strategy as solely a matter of earning rent in
competitive equilibrium, but that a more general ¾ and Coasian ¾ approach is
possible in which strategy is seen as aiming at the creation, appropriation and
protection of added value in a general context of bargaining.  The basic notions are
developed in the setting assumed by the Coase theorem (”Creating, Appropriating, and
Protecting Value: From Competitive Equilibrium to Bargaining”).
However, while this is an instructive exercise, it is only by adding transaction
costs ¾ primary among which are bargaining costs ¾, that a more encompassing
strategic approach can be developed.  Many writers have already noted the
importance of transaction costs to understanding organizational and corporate
strategy (Williamson 1975, 1994, 1999; Dundas and Richardson 1980; Jensen and
Meckling 1992).  However, I argue that transaction costs are also important to
understanding issues of competitive strategy.  The bottomline is that the transaction
cost approach has a broader applicability to strategic issues than it is commonly
assumed.  However, a deficiency of the transaction cost approach lies in its neglect of
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no general theory of behavior, comparable to the expected utility maximization model, appears to be
forthcoming from the psychological and experimental economics research.
3cognitive issues, leading to a possible over-estimation of organizational flexibility.  I
briefly discuss how some well known biases on decision-making may be an
independent and so far neglected determinant of transaction costs  (”Strategy and
Transaction Costs: Impediments to the Creation, Appropriation and Protection  of Value”).
II. Creating, Appropriating , and Protecting Value:
From Competitive Equilibrium to Bargaining
In this section, I critically discuss one key ”move,” to use Williamson’s (1999) term, of
the resource-based perspective, namely that of addressing ”sustained competitive
advantage” (henceforth, ”SCA”).   I shall argue that, to the extent that this analysis is
correct, it is also unnecessarily restrictive, conceptualizing SCA as a matter of earning
rents in competitive equilibrium.   A broader view of strategy, founded not so much
on competitive equilibrium as the bargaining setting underlying the so-called ”Coase
theorem,” is sketched.  In this view, strategy is conceptualized broadly as a matter of
the creation, appropriation and protection of economic value.  Since reasoning
connected to the so-called ”Coase theorem” (Coase 1960) is important to the
argument here and in later sections, the framework may properly be called
”Coasian.”  Note that Coasian insights are a crucial part of the pedigree of TCE
(Williamson 1985).
 Sustained Competitive Advantage: The Resource-based Perspective
The basic issue in strategy research is now conventionally seen as
understanding the sources of SCA.  However, some rather fundamental problems
beset this understanding, particularly in its resource-based version.   To a get an
understanding of these, consider the following nutshell representation of Barney
(1991), a paper that might well be the most cited paper on the issue.4  Barney begins
by formulating the analysis of SCA in terms of the strategies that firms implement in
product markets, so that a necessary condition for obtaining a SCA is that the
product market strategies implemented by the firm are unique.  In other words, only
strategies that are not implemented by competitor firms can secure a SCA.  Barney
then goes on to argue that what makes strategies unique and capable of securing
SCA is that the underlying resources are valuable, rare, hard to imitate and hard to
substitute.  Resources are valuable when they help seizing an opportunity in the
firm’s environment or when they help neutralizing some threat in that environment,
or at least shielding the firm against the threat.  By resources being rare, Barney
seems to have a simple counting sense (as distinct from an economic sense) in mind.5
                                               
4 Indeed, a small industry has grown up around attempts to operationalize and extend some of the
crucial building blocks of the reasoning in that paper, for example, the idea that resources must be
highly costly to imitate and substitute in order to yield a SCA.. See, for example, McEvily, Das, and
McCabe (2000).
5 Thus, on this scheme, if 10 firms control a certain resource, it will not be rare ¾ even if a million
other firms badly want the relevant ressource!
4The hard-to-imitate condition directs attention to whether (or, at which cost)
competitor firms can acquire or accumulate resources with attributes and levels of
attributes similar to some desired ressource which produces a competitive
advantage.  The hard-to-substitute condition refers to whether (or, at which cost)
competitor firms can access resources that will allow them to implement the same
strategies as some successful firm.  This is different from the non-imitability
condition because it is not here required that the underlying resources that
substituting firms access are the same as those controlled by the successful firm in
terms of their composition and level of attributes.
Given these criteria, sustained competitive advantage obtains when a firm
implements a unique strategy that is “backed up” by resources that conform to the
four criteria above.  Thus, SCA obtains when all attempts by competitor firms at
imitating or substituting a successful firm have ceased, so that SCA is seen as a
property of some essentially unspecified Nash-equilibrium.
Some Problems With the Resource-based Perspective
There are many problems with this scheme, some having to do with its internal
logic and some having to do with its interpretation.  For example, the analytical
categories are overlapping, since, for example, resources cannot be valuable if they
aren’t also rare ¾ a rare resource is a valuable ressource (Petersen 1999).  In fact, all
the scheme appears to be saying is that a resource that is valuable on a sustained
basis is a source of SCA, which, of course, is a tautology, at least if we think of
competitive advantage in terms of value creation (as I submit we should do).6
With respect to problems of interpretation, the very meaning of “sustained
competitive advantage” is unclear in the scheme.  Several interpretations are
possible.  For example, it may be defined in terms of strategies, so that a SCA is
defined as implementing a unique strategy that is not implemented by the
competition. (This is the interpretation that is arguably closest to Barney 1991).  The
problem with this notion is that a firm can have a SCA (in the sense of a unique
strategy implemented in a product market) and still only break even!  This is because
the four criteria does not say anything about the costs of implementing strategies,7 so
that factor market competition may complete offset any gains from the firm’s SCA (in
the sense of a unique strategy implemented in a product market).  Such a firm can
hardly be claimed to be successful, although it still has a SCA.  Alternatively, one
may interpret SCA in terms of the firm’s returns, specifically whether its earning of
rents is sustainable in equilibrium (as in Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Peteraf 1993).
Although this interpretation makes economic sense and shall be adopted in the
following, it is hardly the most operational understanding of SCA, depending as it
does on equilibrium and the notion of rents. Firms experience disequilibrium
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5situations and there are other sources of returns than rents.  Moreover, it doesn’t tell
us how those attractive rent streams are created.
In the following, I shall argue that rather than reducing the analysis of strategy
to be a matter of the analysis of sustained rents in competitive equilibrium ¾ that is,
the focus of the RBP ¾, an economic approach should take a much broader view on
both the nature of economic returns and the interaction among firms. OE
perspectives, as well as ideas from (cooperative) game theory, are helpful here.   This
is not necessarily to say that the RBP focus is wrong; merely that it is unnecessarily
restricted.
Exchange and Bargaining
The RBP model, at least in its economics-oriented version, is based on
competitive equilibrium, either explicitly (Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Peteraf 1993)
or implicitly (Barney 1991).8  Thus, in order to ”explain” SCA one introduces
imperfect mobility into such an equilibrium, so that either a story about unique
product market strategies (in equilibrium), or rents (in equilibrium) or both (in
equilibrium) can be told.  For obvious reasons, this is a very specific and constraining
starting point.  The suggestion here is that the analysis of the fundamental aims of
strategy should begin by asking more basic questions and ask these questions, at
least as a starting point, without specific reference to any structure of interaction.
The relevant questions are, How is value created, protected and appropriated? Answering
these questions may involve reference to a competitive equilibrium (they need not,
however), but that particular model is no longer a starting point.
Instead, one might begin in a much more general manner with the basic
economic notion of exchange through bargaining.  This is an appropriate starting
point,  because exchange itself is value-creating (all parties to an exchange expect ex
ante to increase their utility) and because bargaining determine how value will be
split (i.e., the issue of appropriation) and how much value will be dissipated (i.e., the
issue of protection).
Moreover, an exchange/bargaining perspective makes contact to a huge
literature in economics and game theory, which in spite of its obvious relevance has
been under-utilized in strategy research.   Thus, there is a literature on bargaining
processes and the role played by transaction costs, outside options, time preference,
etc. for the outcomes from such bargaining processes (summed up in Muthoo 1999).
Moreover, there is vast literature related to the Coase theorem (Coase 1960).  Since
this literature will play an important in the following, it is appropriate to briefly
recapitulate the theorem: It asserts that in the absence of transaction costs, initial
assignments of property rights or legal entitlements to assets will make no difference
to efficiency in the sense that the identical Pareto-optimal allocation will be realized
regardless of who holds the relevant property rights or bear legal liability, since the
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6parties will always be able to bargain their way to efficiency.   Because it highlights
the role played by transaction costs in determining outcomes, this theorem has been
crucial to the evolution of OE in general and TCE in particular.   I shall argue that it is
also helpful for understanding the nature of firm strategy.
Thus, as the line of reasoning here indicates, I wish to begin from a notion of
unrestricted, zero transaction cost bargaining (as in the Coase theorem) and see what
this tells us about value creation, appropriation and protection (this section). I later
(next section) complicate the reasoning by introducing transaction costs and see what
comes of this with respect to some fundamental issues of strategy.  This has the
advantage of treating in a unified way issues of economic organization and issues of
firm strategy (cf. Williamson 1994).  Thus, as I shall argue there is the same
fundamental transaction cost logic underlying both of these two subjects.
Creating Value
To fix ideas, consider exchange in a vertical chain of players, say a supplier, a
producer and a customer  (as in Brandenburger and Stuart 1996).   How much value
is created in this chain?  ”Value,” as that term is conventionally used in strategy
discourse, typically refers to either the difference between turnover and the value of
purchased inputs (”value added”) or the amount by which the revenue exceeds the
value of all the inputs (thus including the opportunity costs of the suppliers of labour
and capital) the firm uses (”added value”)  (Davis and Kay 1990).9  For an economist,
at least, the latter measure is the more satisfactory one, for it captures the full
economic loss that would result if the firm was broken up and ”its” inputs used
elsewhere in the economy.
Given the latter notion of value, we can unambigiously define value creation in
our vertical triad as the customer’s reservation price (the maximum that he is willing
to pay for the good) minus the supplier’s opportunity cost (cf. Brandenburger and
Stuart 1996: 8).  In a broader context ¾ for example, one involving more customers,
firms and suppliers  ¾  the problem of defining value creation is essentially the
same, although the situation may be more complicated (different opportunity costs,
different reservation prices).  Thus, if all players can freely make exchanges,10 the
relevant measure of value creation will be the highest reservation price minus the
lowest opportunity cost.   This also suggests that in a large-numbers situation, there
will be many ”coalitions” (i.e., customer-firm-supplier value chains) and these
coalitions may not create the same amounts of value (since opportunity costs and
reservation prices differ).
Now, what guarantees that the various coalitions, such as our original customer
– firm – supplier triad will in fact create the value implied by the difference between
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10  In terms of the cooperative game theory perspective that is implicitly underlying the reasoning
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7opportunity costs and reservation prices?  There are two problems in this.  The first
has to do with whether the players will discover the possible gains from trade
implied by the divergences between opportunity costs and reservation prices.  Here
we shall simply assume that players are so ”alert” (in the sense of Kirzner 1973) that
they will indeed discover possible gains from trade.  The second problem has to do
with realizing those gains:  Notice that nothing has been said so far about the prices
at which the customer, the firm and the supplier actually make their exchanges.
These prices will be determined by bargaining, and may not bargaining among the
parties dissipate value? This is  a realistic possibility, which shall be considered later.
For the moment, note that in the absence of costs of bargaining and given that
players’ preferences display no wealth effects, economic theory demonstrates that
they will in fact implement an allocation of resources that maximizes the total value
of the affected parties (assuming that an index representing the total value of a
jointly conducted activity is in fact an appropriate measure of welfare for group
decision making).11
It may be be claimed that this amounts to trivializing the process of value
creation, which becomes reduced to a bargaining between fully rational players with
well-behaved preferences who bargain their way to efficiency (maximum joint
surplus) in a split second.  To some extent this is true, but the obvious answer is that
it is exactly by making extreme mental models that we obtain precise definitions and
that we become able to locate those aspects of the model that need to be changed in
order to bring it closer to reality.
Appropriating Value
Our assumptions that bargaining costs are zero and that players’ preferences
display no wealth effects imply that we can separate the issue of value creation from
the issue of the appropriation of value.   Thus, we may imagine the players to follow
a two-step procedure in which they first agree on the allocation of resources (mix of
activities) that maximize their joint surplus, and then in the next step split this
surplus through the prices and side-payments that emerge from bargaining.  How
will they split value, that is, how much value can each player (say, in our customer-
firm-supplier triad) hope to appropriate?
In order to clarify this we can make use of reasoning related to the so-called
”Shapley value” in cooperative game theory (e.g., Hart 1989).  Roughly, this is a
measure of the value of a player to a game.  More precisely, it is the expected
marginal contribution of player i to a random coalition S.  For a coalition S which
doesn’t contain i, the marginal contribution of i to S is the change in the worth (i.e.,
the value created by the coalition) when i joins S.   We don’t need to worry about the
exact computation of the Shapley value; it is sufficient to make use of the idea of
marginal contribution.  Add to this the assumption that players are engaged in a
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8market game, that is, players can join and leave coalitions as they please, and also
assume that all gains from trade will be discovered.   The assumption that a market
game is taking place and that gains from trade will be discovered intuitively imply
that players will in fact tend to receive their marginal contribution to a coalition (for
some modifications of the overall principle, see Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996).
Protecting Value
The protection of value is evidently a key strategy issue. In fact, the meaning in
the RBP literature of ”sustaining” a competitive advantage is that the resources
producing the SCA are properly protected.  However, protection of value cannot be a
problem in the present context, because under the assumptions of this section, no
value will be dissipated through bargaining and there will be no problem of
protecting the value created in the coalition from, for example, would-be imitators.
Implicitly, this is because the present setting is one characterized by zero transaction
costs, implying that property rights can be costlessly exchanged and protected.   The
other side of the coin is, of course, that we may conceptualize the degree of
protection of value in terms of the capture of property rights to created value and the
costliness of bargaining.  This, however, requires that transaction costs be explicitly
introduced.
What Difference Does It Make?
We may now ask what is gained ¾ relative to, for example, the RBP  ¾ by
thinking of the aim of strategy as a matter of creating, appropriating and protecting
value in a bargaining setting rather than as a matter of earning rents in equilibrium.
At first sight, there may seem to be few substantial differences, since the aim of
strategy in the RBP perspective is to maximize rents over some period of time
(perhaps in perpetuity) which translates into maximizing the value of the firm.
However, on closer inspection it turns out that the present perspective directs
analytical and practical attention to a host of issues about which the RBP is silent.
Most notably, the RBP is not particularly informative about important aspects of the
process of appropriating value.  For example, in Barney (1991), this is put under the
rubric of costly imitation.  And while Barney’s (1986) conclusion that above-normal
returns can only be achieved from inputs that are purchased at a price below their
value to the purchasing firm is, of course, correct, this does not inform us about how
much surplus value the firm can appropriate.   The approach presented here can do
that, as we have seen.
A more methodological difference is that the basic approach here is not
dependent on any assumptions about equilibrium.  Specifically, the approach allows
for disequilibrium, since (subjective) opportunity costs and reservation prices exist
under these circumstances (Kirzner 1973).  In contrast, the RBP treats value creation
as an equilibrium phenomenon.  In this sense, too, the present approach is more
general.
9However, note finally that in an important sense, problems of strategy are, if
perhaps not entirely absent, then certainly very much diminished in importance in
the context of the setting in this section.  Notably, because costs of bargaining have
been assumed away, there is no problem of maximizing the value.  When players’
preferences display no wealth effects, they will agree on what is the value-
maximizing allocation, that is, the efficient mix of  activities, and implement this mix.
Subsequently, players agree, through setting the appropriate prices and monetary
transfers, on the division of the surplus from the relation.  There are no problems of
implementing strategy (the optimal mix of activities) and there are no problems of
sharing the value from the implemented strategy.  Given the assumptions, allocation
and distribution can be completely separated, and both activities present no
substantial problems for strategizers.
Of course, this is utterly unrealistic.  Most fundamentally, it seems to leave very
little room for discretion, since efficient allocations are implemented instantaneously
by rational bargaining players.  However, a starting point in the basic notion of
exchange when bargaining costs are zero is helpful for clarifying what it means to
create, appropriate and protect value, and exactly where we should make
adjustments to obtain a more realistic understanding of these isssues. The relevant
”adjustments,” I shall argue, are largely a matter of making allowance for transaction
costs in the right manner.  It is to the latter task that I turn now.
III. Strategy and Transaction Costs: Impediments to the
Creation, Appropriation, and Protection of Value
Strategy and Transaction Costs: General
The discussion in the previous section was labeled ”Coasian.”  Admittedly, to
some extent this is a misnomer, since Coase (1988) himself emphatically stressed that
only models with transaction costs truly deserve to be called ”Coasian.” His interest
was in explaining real institutions, such as the firm (Coase 1937); in that context, the
role of the Coase theorem was to identify the extreme assumptions that are required
for these institutions to have no allocative effects (i.e., no economic reasons can be
given for their existence).
Although it is possible, as we have seen, to speak in a limited way of
”strategies” in the setting assumed by the Coase theorem, and although this helps to
clarify notions of creating, appropriating and protecting value, the full meaning of
firm strategy can only be grasped by going beyond the setting assumed in the
preceding section.   Just as we can only have firms in a very limited sense (i.e., one
person producers) in the setting assumed by the Coase theorem, we can, in that
setting, only have strategies in the limited sense of coalitions teaming up and
creating and splitting value in certain ways.  In the Coasian setting, there is virtually
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no discretion, since all property rights are perfectly delineated and enforced; hence,
there is no genuine strategic choice.
The other side of the coin is that there are no impediments to realizing the full
economic value from all transactions.   In order to make a room for strategic choice,
we have to break with some of the assumptions underlying the Coase theorem.
More specifically, we have to introduce transaction costs.  However, having
introduced transaction costs, we have also opened the door to strategic problems,
that is to say, impediments to the creation, appropriation and sustainability of value.
In the presence of transaction costs, it is no longer obvious with whom one should
transact, when, and where; bargaining over a surplus dissipates value; and strategic
assets cannot any longer be costlessly protected.  Moreover, because recontracting is
no longer costless, path-dependence emerges, constraining strategic choices.  Thus,
on a fundamental level, transaction costs and firm strategy make direct contact.
The link between transaction costs reasoning and the firm strategy field has
been explicit at least since Williamson’s (1975) demonstration of the capacity of
transaction cost reasoning to throw light on corporate strategy issues ¾ in the guise
of the issue of efficient boundaries ¾, as well as functional and organizational
strategy issues, in the guise of the issue of the efficient internal organization. The
Chandler-Williamson M-form hypothesis became a key insight in the strategy field,
particularly after being supported in a number of influential empirical studies (e.g.,
Armour and Teece 1978).  The classic transaction cost papers on such issues as the
multinational enterprise, vertical supply arrangements, joint ventures, franchising,
sales force organization and much else have similarly become standard references in
the strategy field.   It is not surprising, then, that Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1994.
27) could introduce the proceedings from the 1990 Napa conference on
”Fundamental Issues in Strategy: A Research Agenda for the 1990s” with the
observation that
”… [o]f all the new subfields of economics, the transaction cost branch of
organizational economics has the greatest affinity with strategic
management … Within strategic management, transaction cost economics
is the ground where economic thinking, strategy and organizational
theory meet ” (Rumelt et al. 1994: 27).
Deficiencies ¾ Real and Imagined
As suggested earlier, the enthusiastic endorsement of TCE by Rumelt and his
colleagues wouldn’t seem to be so generally accepted anymore, although TCE
continues to be a strong voice in the conversation in the strategy field.   Rather,
according to a growing number of critics, TCE (and OE more generally), purportedly
neglects a number of key strategy issues and makes assumptions that are overly
unrealistic and perhaps even ”bad for practice” (Ghoshal and Moran 1996).  Some of
these asserted neglects are more apparent than real, and some of the critiques of TCE
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are outright mistaken (Williamson 1999; Foss and Foss 2000a).12  However, some real
deficiencies do exist.  In particular, it is quite true that TCE neglect issues of market
positioning and other issues of competitive strategy (Nickerson 2000), works with a
too narrow conceptualization of transaction costs that turns overwhelmingly on
problems associated with asset specificity to the exclusion of other sources of
transaction costs (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Holmström and Roberts 1998) and
neglects learning and other cognitive issues (Kogut and Zander 1992). The question
then is whether TCE/OE have the potential to remedy these deficiencies.  The
remainder of this section discusses the connection between TCE reasoning and
competitive strategy, touches on some broader notions of transactions, before
moving to a discussion of how learning and cognition relates to TCE.
Market Failure and Property Rights
To see how extreme the ”Coasian” setting of section II is, observe that as the
Coase theorem is normally interpreted, it actually implies that all possible uses of
assets are fully known, all returns from all uses of all assets are perfectly known, all
legitimate and illegitimate uses of assets are perfectly specified, and all this is
perfectly enforceable (Foss and Foss 2000b).  If all rights are completely defined in
this way, there cannot, by definition, arise any conflicts over the use of scarce
resources or the returns from assets, because individuals do not have any discretion
in the use of resources.   Although different coalitions of agents may realize different
levels of value, there aren’t, as we have seen, any problems of bargaining over
surplus, keeping would-imitators at bay, and the like ¾ in short, there are no
strategic problems.  Notably, no value will be dissipated through bargaining or other
attempts to capture value, for example, competitive imitation.
The other side of the coin is that because there are no impediments to efficiency
in the ”Coasian” world, there is also no genuine discretion.  One implication of this is
that there are no hold-ups or no problems of moral hazard.  Thus, one cannot
provide efficiency rationales for economic organization in such a world.  Another
implication is that there can be no genuine strategic choice.  Those who implemented
the best bargain at time 0 will be able to stick to this bargain for good.  In this sense,
the need to take a new decision doesn’t arise in the Coasian world.
In order to find a role for strategic choice (and for firms, contracts, etc.), we
have to throw some spanners into the works of the perfect ”Coasian” world.
Conventionally, these are represented by means the category of ”market
                                               
12 Among the more problematic assertions are that TCE neglects considerations relating to production
(Winter 1988) and focuses all attention on transaction cost to the neglect of transaction value (Conner
1991; Zajac and Olsen 1993; Madhok 1996). These claims can be countered by using the sort of
arguments presented in the previous section.  Thus, efficient economic organization is the one that
maximizes joint surplus, given sharing rules, path-dependencies, information asymmetries and risk
preferences.  Clearly, production – relating to the size of the surplus —as well as exchange —relating
to the sharing of the surplus — are both crucial elements of the process, so that the often-invoked
distinction is a misleading one.  Therefore, it it thus not true that, for example, TCE neglects
transaction value.
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failures,”normally taken to encompass externalities public goods, asymmetric
information and non-convexities of production sets.  To relate these to various
fundamental strategic issues is an elementary exercise á la ”asymmetric information
is a necessary condition for internal capital markets to be superior to external capital
markets,” ”the public goods nature of knowledge may make it more efficient to
exploit excess knowledge through diversification rather than contracting,” ”because
of asymmetric information, knowledge transfer may efficiently take place inside
firms than across firms,” etc.  In fact, these are exactly the arguments underlying the
Alchian-Williamson argument in favor of internal capital markets (Williamson 1975),
the dominant story of diversification (Teece 1982), and the theory of the
multinational enterprise, respectively.   It is not necessary to elaborate in detail about
the importance of these arguments for the understanding of corporate strategy.
However, the point isn’t just that transaction cost reasoning is important to
understanding corporate strategy; rather, it is indispensable, in the sense that
transaction cost ideas explain why it is possible to speak of corporate strategy at all.13
While the importance of transaction cost ideas to corporate strategy issues is
rather widely acknowledged (e.g., Collis and Montgomery 1997), there has been
similarly widespread agreement that TCE/OE are inherently ill-equipped to deal
with issues of competitive strategy.  I now want to develop an argument that is
similar to the one above:  Just as we can only meaningfully speak of corporate
strategy in a positive transaction cost setting, making sense of competitive strategy
also requires that we make use of transaction cost reasoning.  This is because
competitive strategy concerns the capture of rights to ”unprotected” gains from
trade, and this can only take place if transaction costs are positive.
Competitive Strategy, Transaction Costs, and the Capture of Rights
One can show the relevance of TCE for understanding the foundations of
competitive strategy in a fundamental way, one that begins directly from the
conditions underlying the Coase theorem.14  Competitive strategy may generically be
                                               
13 This has been understood at least since Teece’s (1982) demonstration that Penrosian (Penrose 1959)
arguments were not sufficient for an understanding of the diversified firm.
14 Very few TCE contributions explicitly deal with issues of competitive strategy, and none do so in
the way sketched here.   Williamson (1999: 1103) argues that TCE may add to positioning issues by
providing insights into the organization of those strengths that allow firms to position.  However, he
doesn’t provide any detail on this.   Nickerson (2000) argues that the choice of efficient organization
should be seen as complementary (in the Edgeworth sense) to the choice of positioning.  More
specificically, Nickerson argues that 1) targeting a specific set of consumers (i.e., positioning in terms
of product choice), 2) choosing a technology, 3) making specific investments to support the customer
transaction and 4) selecting an organizational structure constitute a ”four-tuple” of complementary
choices and that the firm’s optimal strategy is the tuple that maximizes net receipts.  Finally,
Nickerson and van den Bergh (1999) integrate TCE ideas in the context of Cournot competition.  There
are many other ways in which TCE and competitive strategy may make contact; for example, specific
assets may signal commitment to a market, thus helping the firm to deter entry or avoid price wars;
agreements between colluding firms may be seen as incomplete contracts that are costly to enforce;
etc.
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understood as identical to what Williamson (1994) calls ”strategizing,” that is, the
ensemble of ploys, tactics and signals that firms may employ, for example, in the
service of deterring entry and otherwise create barriers to entry or mobility, creating
or keeping collusion, pre-empting markets, etc. (Porter 1980; Tirole 1988).  As
Williamson (1994) further explains, the strategizing approach is based on power
rather than on efficiency.  Per implication, the pursuit of competitive strategy implies
welfare losses caused by firms exercising their market power; a successful
competitive strategy must impose some deadweight losses on society.  As we have
seen, in the world underlying the Coase theorem, there can be no such inefficiencies,
since all property rights are perfectly specified and enforced and agents can make
costless bargains.  In this world, there cannot be any competitive strategy.  In order
to make provision for competitive strategy, some property rights have to be less than
perfectly specified and protected; thus, some transaction costs have to be present.
From an economic perspective, property rights may be defined as ”… an
individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to consume the services of
[an] asset, or to consume it indirectly through exchange” (Barzel 1994: 394).
Transaction costs may be seen as the costs of capturing (including defining and
exchanging) and protecting such rights.   Thus, incurring the (transaction) costs of
creating a monopolistic position means that the monopolist becomes the economic
owner of the right to the monopoly gain.  A large literature on rent-seeking has been
taken up with the dissipation of value associated with the creation of monopoly
positions, for example, through price wars (”predatory pricing”), advertising, R&D,
etc.  However, as Barzel (1994) points out that literature doesn’t consider all the
ramifications of a would-be monopolist’s attempts to capture rights to the gains from
a monopoly position.  The other side of the coin of capturing monopoly rights is, of
course, that some agents other than the would-be monopolist will have to surrender
their rights.
Consider predatory pricing.  In that case, these other agents (”preys”) are the
predating firm’s competitors and consumers.  However, preys are not completely
defenceless against a would-be monopolizing predator.  For example, the preyed-
upon firm(s) can enter into long-term supply contracts with consumers that will
protect them against the predator.  A contract that stipulates the prevailing
competitive price as the one under which future transacting will take place may be
sufficient.  Thus, the empirically testable proposition that follows from this is that
where the threat of predatory pricing is high, buyers and sellers will enter into long-
term contracts. The relevance for strategy is that where the transaction costs of
entering into and enforcing such contracts are high, there may be a role for
competitive strategy akin to predatory pricing.   The managerial implication is that
strategizing firms are well-advised to check the contractual structure that
characterizes the industry in which they wish to position and compete.
This type of reasoning has broader applicability.  In general, ”… in anticipation
of the potential of becoming the victims of monopolization, people can take
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protective action to avoid the associated loss” (Barzel 1994: 407).15   In principle, this
applies to all those manifestations of firms’ discretion that may cause a deadweight
welfare and/or the capture of consumers’ surplus.    For example, in the standard
analysis of (”first degree”) price discrimination, the monopolist can, absent legal
restrictions, capture the whole of consumers’ surplus.  This, however, is a non
sequitur unless reasons are given why consumers can’t resist the capturing of their
right to the surplus.  At any rate, the property rights to the surplus are not clearly
delineated, and the final allocation is likely to depend on the bargaining costs
confronted by the monopolist and the consumers.  Thus, firms that wish to pursue
competitive strategies that involve price discrimination (e.g., ”versioning” in IT
markets) must carefully consider what sort of customers they up are against;
bargaining with powerful customers may not only not lead to the hoped-for gains
but may also dissipate value.  In general, I submit that the understanding of
competitive strategy will be much furthered by a TCE approach, because TCE allows
for an identification of who may win and who may lose from competitive moves,
and predicts that bargaining is likely to ensue between these.  In contrast, the
conventional approach (Porter 1980) to competitive strategy deals with a firm that
has to position against anonymous industry forces.
Bargaining Costs
So far, notions of bargaining and bargaining costs have been central to the
reasoning. In the present context, we are interested in bargaining, and the
impediments to bargaining, because it emerged from the analysis in section II that
the determinants of the creation, appropriation and protection of value ultimately
can be found on the level of bargaining.  For example, obstacles to bargaining may
mean that gains from trade are not realized (i.e., value is not created), may dissipate
value, and may imply that agents will not receive the marginal contribution to a
coalition.  As Milgrom and Roberts (1990: 58) point out, bargaining costs are also key
to understanding economic organization.  They argue that “… the crucial costs
associated with using markets to carry out transactions … are the costs of bargaining
over short–term arrangements between independent economic agents,” and point
out that this is in contrast to the emphasis in TCE on asset specificity, uncertainty and
frequency under conditions of incompleteness of long-term contracts.  Their main
point is that if short-term bargaining costs are zero, and agents are risk-neutral, hold
common beliefs and have no private information market outcomes will always be
efficient16 ¾ even in a situation characterized by asset specificity and opportunism.
The full set of impediments to efficient bargaining includes a large number of
costs, including the opportunity costs of time spent on bargaining, costs of
monitoring and enforcing an agreement, delay costs, and the costs of not reaching an
                                               
15  Note that this also applies to the TCE explanation of governance structures: These are chosen so as
to minimize the losses caused by hold-ups and morally hazardous activities (Williamson 1996).
16 That is, the same outcomes will be realized as in the situation where the parties could make a
complete long-term contract.
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agreement when efficiency requires cooperation.   While all these costs have been
treated in various segments of the bargaining and economics of organization
literature, this is normally done in what may be described as a “reduced-form
manner.” Thus, while one stipulates some functional form involving, for example,
delay costs, the causes of these costs are seldom inquired into.  To some extent, this is
a result of the very stylized settings assumed in these literatures into which hyper-
rational agents are introduced, so that bargaining problems can at most be caused by
different time preference or asymmetric information.  But there are surely many
other causes of bargaining problems.  As I shall argue next, important among these
causes are various kinds of cognitive biases (cf. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
1990).  Among other reasons, biases are important because they influence the
expectations of bargainers.
Cognition
Most of economics assumes uniform and perfect cognition (Hogarth and Reder
1986).  This is also the case of much strategy thinking influenced by economics.17
More specifically, it is assumed that agents hold the same cognitive categories, and
that the only divergence between reality and experience of reality is manifested in
the updating of priors into posteriors.18  Although Williamson (1998: 12) argues that
“… organization can and should be regarded as an instrument for utilizing varying
cognitive and behavioral propensities to best advantage,” very few TCE
contributions explicitly deal with cognitive issues.19  This is clearly related to the fact
that TCE “… makes only limited contact with the subject of learning” (Williamson
1999: 1103).20  In the present manifestation of TCE, bounded rationality merely has
the function of explaining contractual incompleteness. However, as Williamson
(1998) explicitly recommends, the many ramifications of bounded rationality should
be explored with a view to first identify those regularities in decision-making that
differ from the classical models of Von Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage, then
work out the implications of these regularities for efficient organization, and finally
fold these into the organizational design (Williamson 1998:18).  That is an almost
forbiddingly complicated undertaking, but some suggestions as to how it should be
accomplished may be ventured (see further Heath et al. 1993; Grandori 1997; Mukerji
1998; Williamson 1998; Rubinstein 1999; Eggleston et al. 2000).
Biases
                                               
17  For example, Porter’s (1980) industry analysis approach and much of the resource-based approach
(Barney 1986, 1991).
18 A very notable example of this is the common prior assumption, and particularly the Harsanyi
doctrine that people that have access to the same information cannot possibly hold different beliefs.
19 It may be noted that although TCE has often been criticized for this neglect, few of the critics have
been able to come up with alternatives themselves.
20 Foss and Foss (2000b) tell a limited story about how learning may be incorporated into a TCE
framework.
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It is intuitive that somehow cognitive factors influence exchange, bargaining
and in turn economic organization.21  I submit that one attractive way of furthering
thinking on how cognitive issues influence bargaining processes and therefore
economic organization and firm strategy is to begin with the relevant experimental
literature in psychology on systematic biases to decision-making (which is
summarized in Rabin 1998).    Here are a few of the relevant biases:
The availability heuristic ¾ that is, people tend to think that events are more
probable if they can recall incidents of its occurrence.  An example is that people
typically think that more words, on any given page, will end with the letters “ing”
than have “n” as the second-to-last letter (although clearly this is not possible).
Loss aversion ¾ that is, a loss relative to the status quo is seen as more
undesirable than a gain relative to the same status quo is seen as desirable.22
Preference reversal ¾ that is, the quite pervasive phenomenon that people are
inconsistent when considering two gambles of equal expected value, one gamble
having a high probability of winning a moderate stake and the other a low
probability of winning a larger stake.  The finding is that many persons who prefer
the former over the latter when required to choose between gambles, actually put a
higher minimum selling price on the latter than the former, when they are asked to
evaluate the very same gambles.
Adaptive preferences ¾ that is, preferences, for example, risk preferences (March
and Shapira 1992), adapt to experience in a manner that roughly corresponds to
people coming to prefer what they experience. This may produce intertemporal
inconsistency in revealed choices.
Implications for Economic Organization and for Firm Strategy
The importance of the above decision biases for economic organization derives
from their influencing the bargaining games being played between and inside firms.
More specifically, biases may influence the expectations that bargainers hold.  For
example, biases influence how much employees expects to capture of the firm’s
surplus, how competitive threats are perceived, how the gains from trade at strategic
factor markets will be shared, etc.  The ramifications are many and complicated; only
a few will be considered here.
                                               
21  One illustration is the, possibly apochryphical, story about the Japanese supplier firm, committed to
total quality, zero defects managements, that unable to make sense of a requirement from its
American buyer of 95 % defect free deliveries sent a separately boxed batch of 5 % deliberately broken
parts and a note saying “We don’t know why you want these.”
22  Loss aversion is part of a family of biases that also include the “endowment effect” (i.e., once a
person comes to possess a good, he will value it more than before he possessed it), the “status quo
bias” (which is really produced by loss aversion), and the “diminishing sensitivity bias” (the marginal
effects of in well-being are greater when change is close to one’s reference level than for changes
farther away).   Common to these is that they all involve a reference point.
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As a first illustration, consider strategic change (Rumelt 1995).  For example, we
may imagine a dramatic change in corporate strategy so that the firm withdraws
from a number of markets, concentrating on core business. Of course, many
employees in addition to those that may be laid off will suffer a loss of utility as a
result of this.  Since the change is likely to be at least partly negotiated between the
various stakeholders of the firm, management and owners are likely to offer various
side-payments to reduce these losses of utility.  However, the phenomena of loss
aversion and adaptive preferences are likely to complicate such bargaining games.
First, loss aversion implies that the proposed strategic change will involve a mixture
of painful losses and less-pleasurable gains so that people will tend to resist change.
Second, in an employee relationship, employees develop implicit and explicit
expectations to the contract governing the relationship, and particularly to the
benefits that they believe they deserve under the implicit contract, that is, their
“entitlements” (Heath et al. 1993).23  There is psychological evidence that people tend
to be systematically biased in their estimates of their entitlements, so that these are
perceived as richer (people think they contribute more than they do) and more
systematic (because rare events are often given probability zero, the consistency of
others’ behavior is over-estimated) than they would be to a neutral observer (Heath
et al 1993).  The implication of all this is that side-payments are likely to be much
larger than an “objective” evaluation would suggest.
More generally, the phenomena of adaptive preferences and loss aversion
suggest that an important part of ex post governance is the management of the
formation of the expectations of those agents with which the firm bargains over
inputs and outputs.  The ultimate sharing of value will not just be a matter of the
“objective” contribution of each agent (as in the analysis in section II), but will also
reflect players’ perception of their “legitimate” entitlements.
As a second illustration, consider the availability heuristic.  As we saw, an
implication of the combined effects of loss aversion and adaptive preferences is to
make any status quo salient.  However, the availability heuristic may counteract that
tendency.  The fact that the availability heuristic is likely to be very strongly socially
conditioned only helps here.  For example, public announcements by a CEO that the
competitive situation faced by the firm is dangeroeus may create informational
externalities, because his announcement is taken a relevant signal by employees.
When there is little information about the true state of competition, such externalities
may create informational cascades (Sunstein 1999).
As a final illustration, consider the implication of preference reversal and
adaptive preferences that risk-preference is likely to be context-dependent.
Specifically, March and Shapira (1992) argue that risk-taking is influenced by danger
(threats to survival), slack (more slack leads to more risk-taking), aspiration levels
(people are risk-seeking under the target level and risk-averse above), whose
                                               
23  Under unrestricted, costless bargaining (i.e., the situation described by the Coase theorem), such
expectations would never develop because all rights and duties could be perfectly specified in
contracts.
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resouuces are at risk, and past experience.   This suggests that efficiency of incentive
contracts, which partly relies on shifting risks between parties, is context dependent,
and that some kinds of incentive contracts may in some contexts have perverse
consequences.  For example, consider a firm that not only falls much below its own
aspiration levels but also begins to confront difficulties with sales, and ultimately of
paying creditors.   In this situation, managers may want to assume more risk than
would be sensible to a neutral observer.  If they have been equipped with incentive
contracts in the form of golden parachutes, their incentives to assume excess risks
will be strengthened.
IV. Conclusion
The basic aim of this paper has been to argue on a quite abstract level that TCE (and
OE more broadly) are very useful starting points for thinking about strategic issues.
The pedigree of TCE includes Coase’s work on bargaining in zero and positive
transaction cost regimes and this work provides a basic way in which to think of both
firm strategy and economic organization.   The great advantage of a bargaining/TCE
approach lies in its generality: Contrary to the more rigorous versions of the RBP, it
is not committed to any particular economic model, such as competitive equilibrium.
As an illustration, I have argued that TCE is not merely limited to corporate strategy
and internal organization issues, as is commonly believed, but also allows to think
about competitive strategy in a way that differs from the conventional industrial
economics paradigm.  Still, TCE does have its limitations, primary among which is
its neglect of cognitive issue.  However, the situation is remediable: Drawing on the
literature on biases to individual decision-making represents one way in which TCE
may come to grips with cognitive issues, isolate those that are relevant to economic
organization and fold back the implications of this into organizational design.
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